Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar’s maiden visit to China was in the backdrop of China using her veto at the UN to prevent Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) chief Masood Azhar being designated terrorist. The Chinese explanation that they applied “technical hold, not veto” is a sick cover, akin to China developing military bases in the Indian Ocean region (IOR) but terming them “strategic support bases”. During his visit Parrikar held talks with his counterpart Defence Minister General Chang Wanquan, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) General Fan Changlong and others. He also called on Premier Li Keqiang and visited the HQ of China’s newly integrated western command responsible for border with India.

Parrikar announced that India attaches highest priority to its relationship with China and is committed to further develop the ties. General Chang Wanquan reciprocated by saying, “Hope your visit improves strategic mutual trust between the two armed forces”. The discussions covered bilateral ties with Parrikar pressing the Chinese military leadership for: border transgressions stressing the need to resume the process of clarifying the line of actual control (LAC) and India’s displeasure at China blocking the listing of JeM chief Masood Azhar at the UN. With respect to the latter, similar messages were also conveyed by the External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj and the National Security Advisor (NSA) Ajit Doval during their recent visits to China.

Parrikar’s focus was the boundary issue and ensuring stability along the undemarcated LAC. India has been pressing China to go ahead with the process of clarifying the LAC, absence of which leads to transgressions, but China remains reluctant. Parrikar said both sides moved closer to operationalising hotlines between military commands to enable faster addressing of any incidents. China officially responded to a draft MoU put forward by India and the issue now appears close to be finally settled. Both sides are also looking at a new border meeting point in the middle sector.

Parrikar also raised the issue of Chinese infrastructure projects in the Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK). The Chinese responded that the projects are economic, not aimed at India from a defence or military perspective. There has been improvement in India-China military ties, reflected by Northern Army Commander visit to China in December 2015 after China had denied visa in 2010 to the then Northern Army Commander; five joint India-China counter-terrorism exercises conducted, last one in October 2015; fifth border personnel meeting point in the Ladakh sector opened in August 2015, and; China participated in the International Fleet Review hosted by India this year. However, China continues to back Pakistan’s anti-India jihad, is stoking the fires of insurgency in India’s Northeast, and People’s Liberation Army (PLA) patrols continue transgressing the LAC, denying these are incursion /intrusions. China has been proposing a ‘code of conduct’ as adjunct to the Border Defence Cooperative Agreement (BDCA), insisting such code has been effective in the South China Sea (SCS). But looking at the aggressive provocative actions of China in SCS that have raised tensions to unprecedented levels, it is unlikely China’s attitude astride the LAC will change despite any additional code.

Establishing regular communications at the strategic levels and at tactical levels along the LAC too will make little difference if there is no change in attitude of the President Xi Jinping headed CMC, with Xi recently designated Commander-in-Chief. Incidentally, India and China agreed to adhere to “peaceful negotiations” to settle the vexed border issue and reach a “fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable solution” during the annual 19th round of boundary talks between NSA Doval and his Chinese counterpart Yang Jiechi — which actually means little considering past Chinese experience. Ironically while Sino-Indian economic relations are on the upswing with enormous bilateral trade deficit ballooning in China’s favour, bilateral military relations are constrained by two major factors. First, is the boundary resolution which India considers top priority but China wishes to drag. This is perhaps because China with her economic and military prowess feels it can nibble away more territory. China plundered uranium, copper and gold deposits from Tibet worth one trillion dollars in addition to exploiting water and other natural resources. She did likewise in Aksai Chin. China acquired Shaksgam Valley from Pakistan for the same reason. China knows that there is immense wealth along the Himalayas, is already mining uranium in northern Nepal, and that is why she claimed entire Arunachal Pradesh first time in 2005. The second major reason is China’s unequivocal bias towards Pakistan, Gwadar being the pivot to China’s one belt, one road ambition on the Indian Ocean.

Having sunk $46 billion in the China-Pak Economic Corridor (CPEC), the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops are already guarding the CPEC under construction in Gilgit-Baltistan, and China is raising three divisions to protect the CPEC. Their deployment in PoK-Pakistan astride the CPEC running parallel to the Indo- Pak border has serious strategic ramifications for India. India-China military relations, therefore, will remain constrained despite the outward display of bonhomie.

The views expressed herein are the personal views of the author.