By Lt. General P.C. Katoch (Retd) Former Director General of Information Systems, Indian Army

Guns of 1642 at Haji Pir Pass

Haji Pir

Haji Pir

Indian Flag at Haji Pir- Lt Gen Harbaksh below the flag with other commanders

Though many heroic battles were fought during the 1947-1948 Indo-Pak War by Indian troops hastily inducted into J&K, no other action by Pakistan hurt India so much strategically and economically than the capture of the Haji Pir Pass by 1 PARA on 28 August 1965. Haji Pir Pass (2637m) is located on western fringe of the formidable Pir Panjal Range, which divides Srinagar valley from the Jammu region. A wide, metal highway connected Srinagar to Jammu via Uri-Punch–Rajouri through this Pass, over which bulk of passenger and trade traffic used to ply to and fro prior to Partition. The road is of strategic importance as it connects Uri with Punch but became unusable when major portion of road went to POK. Trained Pakistani terrorists keep sneaking into Kashmir Valley, Punch and Rajouri districts. The entire area of the strategic Pass occupied by Pakistan is known as the Hajipir Bulge.

Buoyed by Nehru’s folly of halting the Indian Army pursuing fleeing Pakistanis in 1948 and knocking on the UN door (leaving 78,114 sq kms of J&K under Pakistani control) plus Chinese PM Chou-en-Lai’s advice to raise a militia to fight behind Indian lines, Ayub Khan had this utopian dream to grab Kashmir Valley through massive multiple infiltrations (Gibraltar Force) and simultaneously capture the single bridge on Chenab River at Akhnur (Op ‘Grand Slam”) which was the key to Indian communications from Jammu and a group of valleys lying south of the Pir Panjal Range and west of Chenab River, most prominent being the Punch Valley. The idea grabbing J&K through guerillas was in vogue in Pakistan despite Maj Gen AO Mitha (who raised the SSG) advising the hierarchy such operations had no chance of success. Ayub’s plan was supported by Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto – another sheikh chilli. Interestingly, Ayub while approving Op ‘Gibraltar’ wrote, “As a general rule Hindu morale would not stand more than a couple of blows delivered at the right time and place. Such opportunities should, therefore, be sought and exploited.” Infiltration operations of the Gibraltar Force comprising number of guerrilla groups of a battalion strength trained by Pakistan Army, SSG and some regular infantry troops, some 5000-7000 strong according to a Pakistani military scholar (26,000 to 30,000 as per Wikipedia) began in first week August 1965. Simultaneously, Pakistan resorted to heavy artillery shelling on Indian positions near Tithwal, Uri and Punch. Indian reaction was swift, advancing up to Kishenganga River in Tithwal Sector, capturing Point 13620 in Kargil Sector, capturing Rishmar Ridge and Pir Sahiba in Tithwal Sector, capturing Sunjoi feature on the outskirts of Mirpur and Ring Contour overlooking the Mirpur Bridge. Next was the capture of Hajipir Pass and then Point 9013 in Tithwal Sector giving our troops complete domination of the Mirpur area right up to the bridge at Jura on Kishenganga River.

If India were to enter into a conventional battle with Pakistan, Haji Pir Pass would be an important strategic objective since it cuts into J&K by severing the Punch-Uri route and can provide access to much of POK. That is the opportunity Ayub provided in 1965. Haji Pir Pass was dominated by hill features Bedori (3760m) on the east, Sank (2895m) on the west and Ledwali Gali (3140m) to the South-West, all of which required capture before tackling Haji Pir Pass, Bedori being 14 kms southeast of the CFL and Haji Pir Pass 10 kms southwest of Bedori. The daring capture of the Haji Pir Pass by Major (later Lt Gen Ranjit Singh Dyal) involving a climb of over 1220m in hours of darkness and heavy rain made international news and proved major setback to Pakistani morale. Its fall completed the link-up of Uri with Punch. The Uri-Punch road link was restored and the strategic Jammu – Rajouri – Srinagar road, which had been in disuse since 1947, became functional again. Later many enemy posts continued to be captured right up to Kahuta, which was also captured subsequently. Unfortunately, under the Russian brokered Tashkent Accord signed on 16 January 1966, Indian and Pakistani forces withdrew to their respective positions as prior to 5 August 1965 and the Haji Pir Pass was returned to Pakistan.

PM Lal Bahadur Shastri signed the accord in good faith to have good relations with Pakistan and was scheduled to meet Ayub Khan next day to extract latter’s promise never to use force again, but he tragically passed away during the night. Blitz published photographs of his body gone black and Outlook published a story of possible conspiracy at international level. Whether his demise was natural or a murder would never emerge but ISI and KGB indulgence with Indian politicians are no secret, with stories of funding elections and link to disappearance of Netaji Subhash Chander Bose. The Hero of Capture of Haji Pir, Lt Gen Ranjit Singh Dyal awarded Maha Vir Chakra in 1965, said in an interview during 2002, “The Pass would have given India a definite strategic advantage …. It was a mistake to hand it back…. our people don't read maps." As for Pakistan, it cannot be expected to be a good neighbor till ISI-military control the country and continue state policy of terror.